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JuRY-EFFECT OF DEVIATION FROM STATUTORY PROCEDURE FOR ExcusrNG JuRoRs-In a prosecution for murder, a special venire was summoned
and a list thereof served on the accused. On the day of trial, he learned for the
first time that the trial judge had excused twenty-six of the seventy-four veniremen summoned. The excuses out of court violated a statute requiring that all
requests for excuse be heard in open court.1 More than the minimum number
of veniremen were present, and when it appeared that the original array might
be exhausted thirty additional veniremen were called. Accused's motions to
quash the jury panel and for a mistrial ·were overruled. On appeal from conviction, held, affirmed. The statute was directory only, and mere irregularity
was not reversible error where there was no showing of fraud or prejudice to
the accused. Two justices dissented. Parker v. State,,(Miss. 1947) 29 S. (2d)

910.
The question presented to the court was not the broad problem of right
to a fair and impartial jury trial, but rather the particular question of whether
the accused had the right to demand strict compliance with a statute designating the time and manner of excusing jurors at their personal request. In the
absence of statute the trial judge may excuse prospective jurors for their personal reasons either in or out of court, at or before the day of trial. 2 The specification by statute of who may claim exemption from jury duty does not pro-

Miss. Code (1942) § 1764.
L.R.A. 1916A, 814 at 823, excusing before trial generally held to be irregular
but not reversible error. State v. Savan, 148 Ore. 423, 36 P. (2d) 594 (1934),
rejected the contention that accused had a right to be present, on the ground that
he was not yet in jeopardy. State v. Bates, 25 Utah 1, 69 P. 70 (1902), rejected the
contention th;it the judge did not have the power to excuse in chambers, relying on
the judge's power to issue orders out of court. Contra: Clay v. State, 40 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 593, 51 S.W. 370 (1899), where defendant had a right to a list of the spi:cial
venire before trial.
.
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RECENT DECISIONS

hibit the trial judge from excusing a juror for other sufficient reasons.8 This
is generally based on the proposition that the accused has no right to a particular
juror 4 and on the distinction between the irregular discharge and the irregular
retention of a juror.11 The same reasoning seems equally applicable· to irregularity in the time and manner of excusing jurors, as in the principal case, but
it is not in itself determinative of the result to be reached. The practicability of
the statute in operation, the effect of other statutory provisions, and the results
intended to be accomplished by the statute all contributed to the decision that
the statute is merely directory. The court believed that under certain circumstances the statutory procedure might be not only impractical but even impossible, as where a juror could neither be physically present in open court nor
have available the needed affidavit at the proper time due to unforeseen events.
In such a case a deviation from the designated procedure would appear more
desirable than sustaining a challenge to the array. 6 The statutory provisions
that "a challenge to the array shall not be sustained, except for fraud," 7 and
"all provisions of law relating to the listing, drawing, summoning and impaneling juries are directory merely," 8 were held to be applicable and determinative
of the character of the statute in question. The dissent contended that the
statutory provision giving the accused the right to have a list of the special
venire an entire day before trial 9 was controlling, since the benefits 10 to the
accused might be diminished where listed jurors are excused before the accused
has had the opportunity, at least, of providing evidence and argument for their
retention.11 The court also considered what is believed to be the purpose of
8 31 AM. JuR., Jury, § 56, and cases cited. The judge's determination of the
sufficiency of the excuses is presumed to have been made for good cause. Vaughan v.
State, 58 Ark. 353, 24 S.W. 885 (1894), stating that the trial judge has personal
contact with the juror, while the appellate court has only the cold record by which
to judge the sufficiency of the excuse.
4 O'Neil v. Lake Superior Iron Ct>., 67 Mich. 560, 35 N.W. 162 (1887), also
discussing the effect of the right to challenge peremptorily. Commonwealth v. Payne,
205 Pa. IOI, 54 A. 489 (1903), holding the accused has no right to a particular
number of jurors on the array.
11 The probability of prejudice to accused from irregular discharge of a juror
being considered too conjectural in absence of a showing of actual fraud or prejudice.
Richards v. State, 36 Neb. 17, 53 N.W. rn27 (1893); State v. Miller, 29 Kan. 43
(1882).
6 Blevins v. State, 204 Ala. 476, 85 S. 817 (1920), rejected this argument
stating that mere matters of inconvenience in practice must yield to statutory rights.
In the present case, the statute could be effectively enforced even though deviations
were allowed in cases of necessity.
7 Miss. Code (1942) § 1796.
8 Id., § 1798.
9 Id., § 2505.
10 The list is intended to enable the defendant to ascertain grounds for challenge
for cause and to use his peremptory challenges more effectively, Parsoits v. State, 22
Ala. 50 (1853). The list is also an effective means of saving the time of the court
which would otherwise be used to examine the jurors.
11 The view of the dissent was upheld where the statute providing for the
manner of excusing jurors related to criminal trials while the directory provision was
general in form. Ala. Code (1923) §§ 8644, 8614. Stinson v. State, 223 Ala. 327,
135 s. 571 (1931).
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the statute, namely, to provid~ a better quality of juror.12 However, the decision reached seems to deny the attainment of that purpose by leaving the statute
without effective enforcement. The court may have felt that reversal of an
otherwise valid juagment is too great a price to pay for this attempt to improve
the quality of jurors.
r
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12 Apparently on the belief that jurors relying on flimsy excuses will be less
likely to present them in open court, and that the trial judge in determining excuses
will be less susceptible to outside influences if his determination is open to public
censure. See Report of Committee on Trial by Jury of the American Bar Association
Section on Judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A. Rep. 559 (1938) for other methods
used in attempts to get a better quality of jurors.

